Exemption of National Security Division Systems-limited access.

§ 16.74 Exemption of National Security Division Systems—limited access. (a) The following system of records is exempted from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G),(H) and (I), (5) and (8); (f); (g); and (h) of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), (2) and (5): Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Records System (JUSTICE/NSD–001). These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), (2), and (5). (b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons: (1) Subsection (c)(3). To provide the target of a surveillance or collection activity with the disclosure accounting records concerning him or her would hinder authorized United States intelligence activities by informing that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of information that is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12958, as amended, and thereby cause damage to the national security. (2) Subsection (c)(4). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d). (3) Subsection (d)(1). Disclosure of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information would interfere with collection activities, reveal the identity of confidential sources, and cause damage to the national security of the United States. To ensure unhampered and effective collection and analysis of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information, disclosure must be precluded. (4) Subsection (d)(2). Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing intelligence activities thereby causing damage to the national security. (5) Subsections (d)(3) and (4). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2). (6) Subsection (e)(1). It is often impossible to determine in advance if intelligence records contained in this system are relevant and necessary, but, in the interests of national security, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide intelligence leads. (7) Subsection (e)(2). Although this office does not conduct investigations, the collection efforts of agencies that supply information to this office would be thwarted if the agencies were required to collect information with the subject's knowledge. (8) Subsection (e)(3). To inform individuals as required by this subsection could reveal the existence of collection activity and compromise national security. For example, a target could, once made aware that collection activity exists, alter his or her manner of engaging in intelligence or terrorist activities in order to avoid detection. (9) Subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent that this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d). (10) Subsection (e)(5). It is often impossible to determine in advance if intelligence records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of national security, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and providing intelligence leads. (11) Subsection (e)(8). Serving notice could give persons sufficient warning to evade intelligence collection and anti-terrorism efforts. (12) Subsections (g) and (h). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent that this system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act. [Order No. 023–2007, 72 FR 44382, Aug. 8, 2007]